Freedom, Sin, and Evil: Lutheran Meditations by Saarinen, Risto
 
 
1 
Freedom, Sin and Evil: Lutheran Meditations 
 
Risto Saarinen 
 
Lutheran and Catholic views of freedom stem from Augustine’s teaching. Both churches 
subscribe to the anti-Pelagian views of the church father, but they interpret these views 
somewhat differently. The standard Catholic teaching holds that all sins are due to the consent 
of the person. This means that the harmful desire, concupiscence, is not yet in itself sin. Only 
when the person willingly consents to this desire, he or she becomes a sinner. Lutherans, 
however, traditionally teach that the presence of harmful desire already qualifies the person as 
sinner. This means that Christians remain sinners. A Christian is “righteous and sinner at the 
same time” (simul iustus et peccator).1 
        This Lutheran doctrine is ecumenically problematic. Modern branches of 
Protestantism, such as Methodists and Pentecostals, tend to emphasize sanctification and do 
not find the view of remaining sinfulness very helpful. The Roman Catholic Church, on the 
other hand, wants to preserve the view of human freedom present in the idea of consent. The 
Lutheran doctrine of “righteous and sinner” does not seem to pay attention to human 
responsibility in avoiding sinfulness. Some progress has, however, been reached in ecumenical 
negotiations. In their Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification, Catholics and 
Lutherans declare that this issue should no longer be regarded as church-dividing. The 
churches hold together that Christians are “not exempt from a life-long struggle against the 
contradiction to God within the selfish desires of the old Adam”2 But this statement does not 
yet settle the questions of freedom and sin in detail. In order to clarify the issues, the German 
Ökumenischer Arbeitskreis published an in-depth analysis of the doctrine of Christian 
sinfulness.
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     Some of the most surprising claims of this analysis are made by Wolf-Dieter Hauschild. 
His study, “The Formula 'Righteous and Sinner at the Same Time' as Element of the Doctrine 
of Justification – a Discovery of the Twentieth Century”4 investigates the use of this formula 
from the Reformation to the present day. Hauschild comes to the surprising conclusion that the 
formula did not play any role before the year 1903. In that year the Catholic scholar Heinrich 
Denifle published his polemical bibliography of young Luther, in which he accused the young 
monk of sexual sins. Denifle considered Luther's view of justification to be an excuse and 
legitimation of those sins. A person can remain in sin, although he is justified.  
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    Understandably, the Protestant scholars set out to refute Denifle's interpretation. In their 
defense they developed a new view of young Luther who struggles with his introspective, 
quilty conscience. The formula simul iustus et peccator which could be found in Luther's 
newly edited monastic texts provided a theological background structure for the Protestant 
scholars.
5
 Their anti-Denifle portrayal of sin-conscious Luther, reminiscent of Kierkegaard 
and Schopenhauer, contributed to the new identity of Lutheranism.   
     Hauschild does not, however, pay much attention to the immediate historical impact of the 
Reformation. He neglects the basic fact that influential figures like Calvin took over Luther's 
view of remaining sin and made it a standard Protestant view. In spite of this flaw Hausschild's  
thesis – that simul iustus et peccator is a discovery of the twentieth century – remains a 
productive error which manages to shed light on some puzzles of modern theology and its 
understanding of freedom and sin.  
    In the following I will use the historical thesis as a springboard towards contemporary 
problems regarding human freedom under the condition of being under sin or bondage. First, I 
show in which sense Hauschild is right. Second, I also argue that he is wrong insofar as the 
Reformation period with its immediate historical impact is concerned. Third, I will apply the 
Reformation discussions to some modern issues, namely, the Darwinist view of human 
freedom and bondage and the post-Kantian problems of evil. Although the modern world no 
longer deals with the concept of sin, the problems of natural determinism and natural and 
unnatural evils continue to haunt people. Does the Lutheran tradition of being righteous and 
sinner offer any resources in dealing with such modern issues of freedom and bondage? Let it 
be immediately stated that my reflections are based on family resemblances rather than strict 
connections. The paper therefore has more the character of meditations than systematic 
arguments in favor of a given position. 
 
The So-Called Lutheran Paul 
 
Luther studies changed radically in the beginning of the 20th century. The new generation of 
scholars of the so-called Lutherrenaissance no longer regarded Luther as the father of 
orthodoxy, but as an individual struggling with his conscience. Karl Holl formulated this turn 
as follows: “Luther comes to the issues which the great way-opener Paul had foreseen and for 
which first Sören Kierkegaard in the 19th century, as well as Nietzsche, have shown an 
understanding.”6 While Kierkegaard himself did not regard Luther as capable of true 
existential dialectics, many eminent scholars of the 20th century regarded Luther as a soulmate 
of Kierkegaard.
7
  
     Because of this individualist and existential paradigm, the permanent struggle with sin 
and its consequences received new importance for Luther scholars. The new editions of 
Luther's early lectures coincided with this interest. As these lectures contain Luther's theology 
of the cross and witness to his personal development in terms of a permanent struggle between 
flesh and spirit, they provide a great number of suitable prooftexts for Kierkegaard-minded 
scholars. 
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     One important side-effect of this trend was the emergence of the so-called “Lutheran 
Paul” an exegetical straw man invented by scholars like W. G. Kümmel and Krister Stendahl 
for the purpose of arguing that historical Pauline theology deviates considerably from the 
doctrinal premises of Lutheranism as they are spelled out in the tradition of Lutheran Paul. 
Contrary to the alleged conviction of Lutheran scholars, modern exegetes offered a new 
perspective in which it was claimed that Paul did not teach the permanent sinfulness of the 
Christian ego in Romans 7. Moreover, Paul had a robust conscience which did not proceed to 
introspection in a Kierkegaardian manner, as the Lutherans allegedly believed.
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     The basic problem of this exegetical debate was and still is that the “Lutheran Paul” was to 
a large extent a product of the early 20th-century scholarship which connected Lutheran 
theology with  the existential-Kierkegaardian struggle. I have discussed this exegetical debate 
elsewhere in more detail.
9
 The 20th-century individualist paradigm of the “Lutheran Paul” 
tends to interpret Romans 7 in terms of complete powerlessness. According to this paradigm, 
the apostle Paul wants to do good but cannot do it; thus he is “weak-willed” in the classical, 
Aristotelian (Nicomachean Ethics, Book 7) sense of repeatedly acting against his own better 
judgment. If this were true, simul iustus et peccator would mean a permanent failure to do 
good. This was not, however, Luther’s own view. 
 
Augustine, Luther and Calvin 
 
The theological roots of Reformation debates on freedom are found in Augustine's theology, in 
particular in his diverse statements concerning the relationship between the harmful desires 
and the state of sinfulness. One can distinguish between different phases in Augustine, 
depending on how he understands Paul's conflict in Romans 7.
10
 
    The young Augustine reads Romans 7 as a description of the powerlessness of a worldly 
person without grace. After 411, however, Augustine revises his view and thinks that the 
speaker of Romans 7 is the Christian apostle. This speaker cannot do good in a perfect and 
successful manner, because the repugnancy of remaining sin always effects some impurity. But 
the apostle can nevertheless achieve good in an external manner. In his late debates with Julian 
Augustine increasingly moves towards claiming that the remaining concupiscence almost 
compulsively causes some sinfulness in the actions of Christians. Although Augustine never 
quite moves to teaching the irresistibility of concupiscence, he nevertheless moves towards 
claiming that the presence of concupiscence is already in itself sin. 
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     Already in his Lecture on Romans (1515/16) Luther comes to the conclusion that the old 
Augustine who writes against Julian is the definitive doctrinal authority. With respect to the 
interpretation of Romans 7 and the issue of Christian sinfulness this means that even exemplary 
Christians like Paul are to be called sinners, since concupiscence contaminates all their actions. 
The act of consent is, therefore, not an adequate criterion of a person's sinfulness: the mere 
presence of concupiscence is sufficient to qualify the person as a sinner.
11
 
     This does not mean, however, that the Christian would be entirely powerless. In Luther’s 
view, apostle Paul is an example of strong-willed Christian. In spite of the remaining sin, he 
can do good, although not in a perfect and pure manner. The apostle’s complaint does not, 
therefore, pertain to his existential powerlessness, but to remaining gap between doing good in 
an externally satisfactory manner and doing good in a perfect and pure manner. At least since 
Rudolf Hermann Luther scholars have seen that this is the historical meaning of simul iustus et 
peccator.
12
 Luther thus takes over the view of late Augustine, as the church father spells it out 
especially in his late writings against Julian. The difference to the Roman Catholicism is found 
in the notion of consent: for Luther, the sin remains in the person even when there is no consent 
to sin. 
      Given that this is the correct interpretation of simul iustus et peccator, Hauschild's thesis 
meets serious problems. The Reformation period and later Protestantism received the view 
expressed in Luther's phrase, taking it to mean that the remaining concupiscence present in all 
Christians is sufficient to qualify them as sinners, although many good Christians may be able 
to follow God’s will relatively well in their external actions. This result already takes away the 
edge of Denifle’s criticism of Luther: both Lutherans and Catholics can interpret Paul and 
Augustine as saying that externally good actions are possible. At the same time this view also 
separates Luther from the existential anguish of Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer as well as from 
the straw man erected by modern biblical scholars. The justified sinner may have a fairly robust 
conscience and strong will: he is not perfect, and he is aware that he is therefore sinful, but he 
may nevertheless trust in God’s promises and lead a moderately good life. 
    Hauschild focuses on the 19th century and deals with earlier history only in passing. 
Although Luther's Lectures on Romans were only discovered and edited in Karl Holl's times, 
the description of remaining sinfulness outlined above can be found in other widely distributed 
treatises, for instance in Luther's writing Against Latomus.
13
 According to this description, the 
sinfulness of the justified Christian means that the harmful desire of concupiscence continues 
to color all his or her actions, leaving them imperfect in some sense. Being righteous and sinner 
means a permanent struggle, but it does not imply a complete failure in this struggle. The fact 
of struggle is already sufficient to qualify the person as sinner. Therefore, the demarcation line 
of sinfulness is not drawn according to the capacity of consent or will-power. Even a person 
who is relatively free or strong-willed in the sense that she can successfully rule over her own 
actions nevertheless remains a sinner since sin inevitably in some way colors her actions, 
keeping her in the struggle. This understanding of “righteous and sinner at the same time” was 
not only discovered but was also widespread during the Reformation period, as we can see, for 
instance, from John Calvin's Institutio.
14
 
                                                 
11
 Luther, Martin, Werke, Weimarer Ausgabe (WA). Weimar et alii 1883-, Bd. 56, 
339-347. 
12
 See Hermann, Rudolf, Luthers These “Gerecht und Sünder zugleich”. Gütersloh: 
Gütersloher Verlagshaus 1930. 
13
 See Saarinen 2008. 
14
 Calvin, John, Institutio christianae religionis (1559). Corpus reformatorum 30. 
 
 
5 
                                                                                                                                                        
Braunschweig 1864, 3, 3, 10-13. 
 
 
6 
     In this Protestant anthropology of sin, the root of the problems does not lie in the harmful 
desire as such, but it is the “flesh” which remains the seat of sinful passions and desires. The 
harmful emotions cannot be eradicated or moderated in the Stoic manner, because they 
exemplify the rule of the flesh in the current life. Augustine's fundamental problem with 
Pelagius and Julian was his growing conviction that the carnal aspect of humanity cannot be 
abolished in this life. Luther radicalized this feature in his early denials of human freedom; 
although Melanchthon and Calvin may have moderated this radical view to an extent, later 
Protestantism basically followed Luther's view of “righteous and sinner at the same time”. The 
20th-century Protestantism gave new and exaggerated interpretations of this view, connecting 
it with introspective conscience, complete powerlessness and Kierkegaardian existentialism. 
Hauschild is to be commended for seeing this development. But the Protestant theology of 
simul iustus et peccator cannot be reduced to its 20th-century outlook. 
     Given this, we nevertheless need to ask a broader systematic question regarding the issue 
of “righteous and sinner at the same time”. Does it really matter whether we understand this 
doctrine to mean (a) that Christians are powerless but not simply evil or (b) that Christians are 
strong-willed but not simply virtuous? For both (a) and (b) assume a dualistic anthropology in 
which two opposing principles, spirit and flesh, remain in the state of struggle. The modern 
world, however, no longer presupposes such over-personal metaphysical principles which 
determine both the external range and internal quality of a person's will-acts. If this is true, the 
picture of struggle, be it under the guise of (a) or (b), has lost its validity. 
    In the following it will be argued that the idea of over-personal forces ruling over a 
person’s destiny has not disappeared. The biological world-view employs a complex notion of 
over-personal forces. Moreover, modern deliberations on the problem of evil continue to ask 
after the status of various natural forces manifesting themselves in illnesses and catastrophes. 
A person often remains in constant struggle with such forces. In this struggle the modern 
person asks, among other things, whether these forces are inevitably to be regarded as being 
morally neutral, as Immanuel Kant and many others claim. While the natural forces are not 
produced by an intentional will, they nevertheless seem to contribute to our understanding of 
goodness, freedom and evil. Although our struggle with natural forces is not essentially a 
struggle between good and evil, it may, therefore, be connected with it. Given this, there may 
be some applications of Lutheran theology of evil, sin and freedom to the modern issues. 
 
The Biological World-View 
 
In 1859, Darwin published his Origin of Species, a work which has contributed to the modern 
discussions on human freedom and determinism probably more than any other single book. 
The 20th-century breakthroughs in molecular biology have led to the so-called evolutionary 
synthesis in which Darwin's claims regarding populations and natural selection are connected 
with the workings of the genes and their DNA.
15
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     The evolutionary synthesis contains many anthropological views which continue to 
challenge theologians and philosophers. One very basic view which does not require deeper 
scientific details is the distinction between genotype and phenotype. All individuals are 
permeated by a material dualism in which two principles are operative. 
    First, the properties of my body represent the phenotype resulting from the random 
combinations of my genes during the procreation. My life is dependant on this phenotype in a 
complex manner. I have not chosen this body, but my responsible actions can influence its 
development and the utilization of its capacities. The phenotypical body is in this sense my 
oikos, the temple in which I can reside and with regard to which I  may have some, though 
limited, freedom. 
     Second,  I carry with me the heritage of my genotype, a complex mess of nuclear acids 
from which an expert can read not only my personal properties, but also an astonishing variety 
of more and less successful features of my ancestors since Adam and Eve, maybe even since 
the earlier days of creation. The duality of genotype and phenotype is in many ways startling 
and fascinating. All individuals carry within themselves the history of much of the human race. 
Some inherited features stemming from the distant past may suddenly and dramatically 
become operative and end the life of the phenotype without any possibility of delay or 
negotiation. 
     This means that the phenotype, the somatic body, is also in itself deeply dualistic. On the 
one hand it is the temple of the spirit: education and cultural progress can take place when the 
human body works properly. On the other hand, the phenotype is also a body of death: since it 
constantly manifests the underlying genotype, it remains at the mercy of this broader 
inheritance. Through this genotype all past generations, dead so long ago, continue to 
contribute to the present success of the ego, the individual here and now.  
     At the same time it is also true that each genotype is different and unique, since the 
enormously long, though finite, series of genetic recombinations (in the so-called meiosis) as 
well as some mutations have made each DNA unique. The gigantic information available in 
our nuclear acids thus both constitutes our individuality and makes us all children of Adam and 
Eve. The good works of our ancestors do not, however, help us since their achieved properties 
cannot be genetically transmitted. Their virtues remain in their proteines which do not have a 
feedback to the nuclear acids. 
     One of the doctrines of Darwinism states that neither the species nor the gene but the 
individual phenotype is the object of natural selection. In this sense the “nature and destiny of 
man” always remains the nature and destiny of one individual: every nature is different due to 
its underlying differences in the nuclear acids, and the destiny of each phenotype is unique, 
given the unique time and place it occupies in its environment. Since the process of natural 
selection is directed towards individual phenotypes and presupposes a constant production of 
differences, Darwinism is a highly individualistic world view. At the same time each individual 
is deeply dependant on the past generations, since they have constituted the genotype on which 
the properties of this individual depend. 
     When Paul, Augustine and Luther describe the human existence as an existence between 
the flesh and the spirit, these two terms refer to the larger over-personal spheres in which the 
individual here and now participates. The individual, that is, the bodily phenotype or  the 
somatic ego, is something distinct from both of these spheres. Although the body remains 
deeply dependant on the flesh, an individual body only represents a particular phenotype of the 
larger anthropic nature. The flesh thus operates like a genotype, a pool of anthropic nature from 
which the bodily individual becomes differentiated. Reading Romans 7 and 8 from this 
perspective can lead to meditations which resemble Luther's view of simul iustus et peccator, 
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the view of such bondage under larger powers which does not rule out individual particularity, 
responsibility and freedom. Let me emphasize that the following meditation is strictly 
systematic, not historical. 
 
Romans 7-8 and Naturalism 
 
     In Romans 7:17-18 Paul argues that the lack of goodness in his action is not due to his ego, 
but to the sinful flesh still dwelling in him. He thus experiences a dualism in which a deeper, 
over-personal power has a hold over Paul's actions. The ego may denote either the past or the 
present Paul (or the typological person discussed); the verses describe, in terms of a posteriori 
reflection, the curious experience that the actions of this ego were to a large extent determined 
by another, over-personal power (sin, flesh) that dwells within the ego (alla hê oikousa en 
emoi, 7:17). This experience of something bigger influencing the decisions of the somatic ego 
offers a certain parallel to the modern postulate of genotype. 
     The expression of Romans 7:18: “For I know that nothing good dwells within me, that is, 
in my flesh” is nevertheless prima facie different from the evolutionary anthropology, as the 
genotype is not merely the source of defects, but also of all useful capacities. In 7:18, the 
somatic oikos is the ego, the phenotypic person who experiences that there are other inhabitants 
within it, and that they are not good. A Darwinist might now remark that the genotype contains 
a resource of the past which has survived through the millennia of natural selection. How can it 
be that it contains nothing “good”? 
     To respond to this remark, a slightly different systematic angle is needed. The so-called 
“naturalistic fallacy” formulated by G. E. Moore states that we cannot infer the nature of 
“goodness” from the natural properties of usefulness, economy or some other beneficial 
property available for us.
16
 If natural selection in the long run favors some genotypic variants 
(exemplified by certain individual phenotypes) because of their circumstantial adaptive 
abilities, we cannot infer that they would be “good” in the fundamental sense of agathon. The 
favored variants are not selected because of their inherent goodness but because of the adaptive 
capacity related to their accidental environment. In this – very systematic and ahistorical – 
sense there is “nothing good ... in my flesh”. This flesh, the genotypic nature, is a result of long 
natural selection, but the selection has not made it good. Evolution does not guarantee 
perfection or even progress; it only brings about a capacity to stay above the threshold of 
survival.  
    As Romans 8:6 famously points out, both flesh and spirit have their relative or particular 
reasons (phronêma). The phronêma of the flesh is related to death and remains hostile to God 
(8:5-8) because it focuses on the natural course of things. A naturalist must presuppose the 
death of all organisms and leave God out of his methodological phronêma.  Let it be added 
that Paul's view of naturalism may be too negative in his “flesh discourse” – some other New 
Testament passages could balance this – but this is mainly because he wants to highlight the 
nature of sinful bondage as something which is both personal and collective-overpersonal at 
the same time. Although an individual may have a good phenotype and a strong will, being 
therefore successful in some undertakings, the over-personal rule of the flesh continues and 
makes the person sinful in this sense. 
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     In this very peculiar manner there is an argumentative parallelism between Luther's view 
of permanent bondage under sin and the 20th-century evolutionary synthesis. The 20th century 
invented a new anthropological dualism, that of phenotype and genotype. Also the Darwinian 
dualism has its existential side: even healthy people can today become anxious of their possible 
genetic disorders which may darken their life or  the life of their children. In genetic analysis 
they also need to deal with their parents and ancestors in new, unprecedented ways. 
     What is the role of freedom in view of such issues? The propagation of complete 
powerlessness will not help: we need to fight all diseases, and we must also take care of others 
who do not have resources to fight them. At the same time, it would be illusory to claim that we 
could repair the genetic disorders and help the evolution to reach its peak. There is no such 
peak in evolution, but the struggle continues. A strong will and a certain realism are thus 
needed. There is, consequently, a certain parallelism to the strong-willed behavior of the 
apostle Paul in Romans 7-8. 
 
The Experience of Malum    
 
Is there a connection between the natural, biological powers which produce health and illness 
and the deeper philosophical problem of evil? After Kant, the normal answer has been 
negative. Good and evil are produced by the intentional acts of willing agents; natural forces do 
not, therefore, relate to the problems of good and evil. 
      Ingolf Dalferth has, however, recently argued that evil should not be identified in terms 
of the agent's intention but in terms of the experience of the patient or recipient. Suffering and 
illness are for Dalferth examples of evils which lie beyond all evil intention but are 
nevertheless experienced as evils.
17
 In some sense the naturalistic fallacy works in one 
direction only: there is no natural goodness, but there may well be natural evil. We have seen 
that the elaboration of sin and human bondage in Paul, Augustine and Luther described above 
points towards a view in which evil is natural and resides in the over-personal constitution of 
the flesh, whereas goodness is non-natural and can only be given with the spirit. 
     Dalferth argues that this Kantian definition of evil in terms of intentional will is much too 
narrow and much too simple. For him, the most adequate criterion of evil is the experience of 
the patient, the victim or the person who suffers. If it is the case that the victims of accidents, or 
cancer patients, or other suffering persons experience that something bad or evil has happened 
to them, although there is nobody to blame, then the suffering in question is related to evil and 
raises the problems related to evil.  
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     Both the strength and the weakness of Dalferth's position are obvious. Its strength lies in 
its realism. When people are facing a serious accident, a fatal illness or a death of their loved 
one, they feel and experience that something bad has happened to them. Accidents and deaths 
seldom produce moral elevation. They rather draw people to vicious circles of hopelessless, 
deprivation and social problems. Although these events do not include evil intentions or 
wicked persons, they are connected with some inherent malum, badness or evil that results 
from them. It is therefore honest and realistic to say that they are not merely natural processes 
(which they of course also are, and this should be said), but they involve an experience of evil.  
    The weakness of this position is that it substantiates the evil in a way which runs contrary 
to our modern thinking habits. It seems strange to say that, in addition to some evil human 
intention, there exists evil which encounters us in accidents and illnesses. This sounds dualistic 
and it may lead to a postulate of the existence of personal evil forces. The following meditation 
does not want to proceed to that direction, but it argues that the discussion on natural evil 
resembles the historical problem of remaining sin. There is some malum which affects the 
existence of all people, however strong-willed and good-willed they may be.  
     Dalferth does not want to claim that all suffering is evil or that suffering and evil are 
synonymous. Both phenomena are extremely complex and, in addition, our experience of them 
is  complex and individually different. Dalferth  underlines the non-dualistic point that evil 
remains secondary and parasitic to positive creation: illness requires body, accidents 
presuppose the normal course of things, and so on. What he wants is, however, to take seriously 
the experience of the one who suffers: this experience of malum cannot be taken away by 
simply saying that nobody intends, or has intended, to harm you.  
 
Coping with Suffering 
 
    If this analysis is right, we should ask: how can we cope with the suffering and malum that 
surrounds us even in the relative protection of welfare society? The first option is (1) the 
project of rationalizing evil by means of writing an intellectual theodicy. My interest here does 
not, however, proceed to that direction. I am primarily interested in the concrete wrestling of a 
relatively free and strong-willed person with the powers of sin and evil, including the evil 
produced by natural forces. I admit that the procedure of writing intellectual theodicy may also 
serve as a behavioral strategy in this wrestling, but my primary attention is devoted to other 
strategies. 
    (2) The catastrophies of nature are often met in terms of progressive optimism, an attitude 
which aims at upholding the Kantian view of real evil as being always intentional. According 
to this view, natural adversitites are connected with our ignorance and lack of political good 
will. When we educate ourselves and next generations, we can overcome all adversities and 
make the world progressively a better place. Progressive idealism may the most viable political 
and social strategy of coping with suffering. Education and welfare may not provide the last 
answers to the problem of suffering, but they may be the adequate political tools at our 
disposal. In this sense the Enlightenment project of progressive optimism continues to be a 
successful way to counteract the adversities produced by natural forces. It makes ample use of 
the available resources of will-power and freedom. 
    There seems to be, however, a limit beyond which this strategy is no longer helpful. 
Extreme forms of progressive optimism lead to something like omnipotence delusion. In such 
extreme form people assume that some intentional agent is behind all problems and adversities 
and can be held responsible for them. Through naming the responsible persons the society can 
take care of all kinds of badness. The strategy thus broadens the Kantian idea of evil will 
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lurking behind all kinds of malum. Thus one can say that the Foreign Ministry of Finland was 
responsible for various failures related to the Tsunami catastrophe, or that the American gun 
laws were responsible for the rampant shooting in the campus. If all guns were prohibited, no 
shooting could occur. Or, if everybody carried a gun, rampant shooters would be effectively 
silenced by other gunmen and gunwomen. 
    The delusion of omnipotence is, of course, a philosophically naive position. It is 
encouraged by the mass media which wants to personify the responsibilities of all kinds of 
occurrences that remain beyond human control. According to this line of thought, all 
adversities, even illnesses and natural catastrophes, are results of human failure and could be 
controlled by heroic responsibility. If we lived healthily, illnesses could be prevented. If we 
would take good care of the mother Earth, no natural catastrophies would occur, especially if 
we could also construct effective warning systems. We often courageously think that we can 
carry the responsibility of everything in our lives, and in the lives of others. But we are not as 
omnipotent as we would like to be and progressive optimism does not always work. For this 
reason, we also need other strategies of coping with pervasive suffering.  
    (3) A very traditional behavioral strategy of coping with suffering is the act of complaining 
to God. Amidst of suffering, religious persons (sometimes even less religious persons) doubt 
God's goodness and omnipotence, complaining: where were you? Why did you let this happen? 
Philosophically speaking, such complaints to a divine ombudsman may sound primitive and 
strange. If there is a God, God would most likely not be there to satisfy our wishes regarding 
the course of life. This strategy has, however, been meaningfully and even successfully 
emplyed by Christians in various times. The Lutheran bishop of Helsinki, Eero Huovinen, has 
on two occasions presented such a lament in Finnish mass media. The first time was after the 
Estonia boat catastrophe, the second time after the tsunami catastrophe. When asked by the 
journalists to give a religious or theological explanation, Huovinen meditated on the absence 
and sleep of God and presented critical questions towards God.
18
 
    Some devout Finnish Christians were irritated and claimed in the public that the bishop 
should be the advocate of God and not criticize God's purposes. But others were consolated to 
hear that the bishop sided with other puzzled individuals who lamented and  complained. Thus 
the public complaint became a part of national sorrow enactment, Trauerarbeit, and served for 
a therapeutic purpose. It is not the task of human being to explain the suffering, but to complain 
in solidarity with other suffering people. It is therapeutically important that there is an address 
of this complaint, an ombudsman who receives the complaint of suffering consumers. It would 
have been ridiculous from the bishop to utter quasi-scientist or quasi-philosophical sentences, 
such as: tsunami results from the movement of continental plateaus, or: suffering is the price 
we pay of human freedom. The attitude of progressive optimism should also, at least for some 
proper time, yield to the phenomenon of massive sorrow. 
     (4) Another behavioral strategy is also therapeutic and Christian, but more sophisticated 
than the strategy of complaining. This strategy has been called nihilodicy or the questioning of 
evil by Tuomo Mannermaa. In a very personal book he tells how he survived the crisis caused 
by his wife's death.
19
  The burden of suffering and questions of theodicy surrounded the life of 
the widower. In the depressive moments he very consciously focused his mind on the 
remaining good objects and meditated their lasting value. This meditation evoked the argument 
                                                 
18
 These are collected in a Finnish volume: Huovinen, Eero, Käännä kasvosi Herra, 
Helsinki: WSOY 2005. 
19
 Mannermaa, Tuomo, Pieni kirja Jumalasta. Helsinki: Kirjapaja 1995 (English 
translation in preparation).  
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of nihilodicy, asking why evil and suffering cannot get hold of all things in life, but some 
objects remain good and beautiful, staying thus outside of the grasp of malum.  
    Focusing on objects and meditating the argument of nihilodicy slowly helped the widower 
out of the depression. The argument of nihilodicy has some important rational sides, for 
instance the idea that evil has no autonomous being but it can only corrupt the good objects in a 
parasitic manner. Another rational side is given in the observation that the good objects, like 
the garden, four seasons, streams and other scenes of water, animals, children, good art, starlit 
night and the laws of the universe (such lists are a permanent topos in consolation literature), 
are lasting whereas adversities come an go in a contingent manner. 
    Fundamentally, however, the force of object therapy does not reside in rational arguments, 
but in the mediation from the good objects to the suffering soul. The good objects can 
communicate some of their goodness to the spectator and thus very slowly heal the soul. At the 
same time, the argumentative side of questioning evil helps the person to continue to focus his 
or her mind on the good objects. The object therapy need not be religious; the suffering person 
may simply meditate the good objects of her garden as alternatives to the chaos. Boethius has 
forcefully elaborated philosophical object therapy in his Consolation of Philosophy, a work 
which combines our first and fourth way of coping with malum. 
 
Suffering and Virtue 
 
    It is vitally important to realize that the four strategies outlined above do not manifest 
complete powerlessness or lack of freedom, but they are accompanied with endurance and 
strong will in facing the suffering. For the most part, they are no philosophical solutions of the 
problem of evil, but exemplify the practical opportunities available to a person in a difficult 
situation. They formulate a particular kind of simul, namely, the simultaneity of suffering and 
virtue. If simul iustus et peccator describes the being of a Christian, the simultaneity of 
suffering and virtue captures the doing of many Christians and other people of good and robust 
will. It is a doing in which activity stems from passivity and passion.
20
 
    In sum, the problem of evil and the different ways of coping with suffering exemplify the 
human encounter with over-personal forces. Philosophers may debate whether such forces are 
a malum or simply natural obstacles, but I have been siding with Dalferth’s claim that they are 
at least experienced as malum. The experience we have is an experience of continous struggle 
or wrestling.  Encountering such force and struggling with it requires a robust will and a 
strong personal character. 
     There is thus a certain parallelism between the will-power needed to struggle with sin and 
the will-power needed to cope with suffering. The struggles of Paul and Luther thus have their 
non-identical but sufficiently identifiable counterparts in the struggles of modern human 
beings. Paradoxically, the bondages of sin, obstacles and malum give testimony to our personal 
freedom: in encountering adversities, more intentional effort is needed than in everyday life in 
general. In this sense personal freedom not only co-exists with the various bondages which 
shape our lives; it even emerges from the struggle with them. Such coincidences of suffering 
and virtue in the realm of doing may even point towards deeper theological simultaneities of 
being. 
 
 
                                                 
20
 For a broader treatment of similar topics, see Stoellger, Philipp, Passivität aus 
Passion. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2010. 
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Summary 
Risto Saarinen discusses the historical meaning and contemporary significance of the 
Reformation doctrine of “righteous and sinner at the same time” in its relationship to freedom. 
He argues that this doctrine does not mean a permanent inability to do good, but rather a lasting 
struggle in which good actions can only take place with difficulty. Saarinen regards that the 
exegetical paradigm of “the Lutheran Paul” often exaggerates the lack of freedom in Christian 
life. After a historical presentation of the views of Paul, Augustine, Luther and Calvin the 
article looks briefly at the anthropology of modern evolutionary theory. The contemporary 
distinction between the indivual phenotype and the inherited collective pool of genes, the 
genotype, bears some resemblance to the dualistic anthropologies of the Christian tradition and 
their understanding of freedom. Saarinen also discusses the various experiences of evil and 
coping with suffering, arguing that they exemplify a simultaneity of suffering and virtue in 
which our freedom can be manifested. The picture of struggle between different forces 
connects Pauline and Lutheran anthropology with the natural sciences and the modern 
problems of evil. 
